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On 5th March 2020, the Appeals Chamber (AC) of the International Criminal Court
(ICC) unanimously authorized the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) to commence
an investigation into the situation in Afghanistan. This decision reversed the
controversial Pre-Trial Chamber (PTC) decision which, citing the ‘interests of
justice’ (IoJ) clause, had refused to authorize the investigation requested by the
OTP. However, the ACs decision failed to shed any light on the problematic reading
of the IoJ clause by the PTC using interpretative tools provided by the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties. In the end, the use of the VCLT to cure the
indeterminacy of the IoJ fails. The content of the IoJ remains obscure.
The PTC’s unanimous rejection of an investigation pursuant to Article 15(4), in a
situation under preliminary examination since 2007, had resulted in scrutiny of a
judicially unexplored and ambiguous provision of the Rome Statute. This was the
first rejection of a request by the Prosecutor for an investigation while exercising
her proprio motu power under Article 15(3). Moreover, it was the first judgment that
invoked the interests of justice clause under Article 53.
According to Article 53, the Prosecutor is obligated to consider three factors to
decide if there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation: jurisdiction of
the Court, admissibility of the potential cases, and the interests of justice. While the
first two factors are positive, the third one is countervailing in nature. In other words,
the Prosecutor has to establish the first two factors expressly but isn’t required to
show that opening an investigation is in the interests of justice – because in the
presence of the first two factors, opening an investigation is presumed to further
the cause of justice. In contrast, when the Prosecutor decides not to open an
investigation based exclusively on the reasons of IoJ, she has to establish the same
before the PTC.
Applying the VCLT to the Rome Statute – a matter of course?
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), 1969 provides the general
rule of treaty interpretation, which reflects customary international law. Its customary
nature crystallized under Article 31-32 of the VCLT has been affirmed by the
International Court of Justice.
While scholars have debated and questioned the appropriateness of using the
generic framework  of the VCLT in interpreting specific international criminal treaties,
their concerns largely arise out of cases regarding the construction of crimes and
effects on defendants.
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The International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia (1993) and Rwanda
(1994) came into being qua resolutions adopted by the UNSC, with their statutes
attached to said resolutions. Although the governing statutes weren’t treaties per
se, their application and interpretation were still shaped by the VCLT. In contrast,
the ICC, unlike its predecessors, has been established by a multilateral treaty,
the Rome Statute. The Court has time and again made recourse to the VCLT and
has confirmed its applicability for the interpretation of the Statute.
The primary interpretive principle under Article 31(1) provides the text of a treaty to
be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to
the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.
Judges of international criminal tribunals, however, have used various interpretive
principles arising out of Article 31, i.e. ordinary meaning, object and purpose and
drafter’s intention, in various instances, instead of using it as one single interpretive
rule. Although such an exercise of interpretation by the judges doesn’t run foul to
Article 31 as such, it results in uncertainty as to which is paramount for the matters
of international criminal law. In the absence of a regime-specific framework, the
VCLT remains the tool for interpreting the Rome Statute. Though the extent of
applicability of the VCLT within the Rome Statute remains an unanswered question,
the IoJ clause highlights limitation.
“Interests of Justice” and the VCLT – an exercise in interpretation
There are differing interpretations of the “interests of justice” keeping in mind
questions of peace versus justice within the Statute. Scholars arguing for a
broader meaning of the IoJ clause have attempted to use the VCLT as a tool of
interpretation. They have found the clause to include factors of peace and security.
Following the same argument, Afghanistan’s PTC ruling incorporated ‘complexity
and volatility of the political climate’ (para 94) within the interests of justice.
However, the question that arises is whether the application of VCLT provides us
with any factors, let alone extra-legal factors such as peace, politics, geo-political
relations, etc., to be read into the IoJ.
The phrase IoJ was first introduced to the Rome Statute discussions in 1996 by
the British representative through a discussion paper, proposing an amendment
to the then Article 26(4) (ILC Draft). This vested the Prosecutor with the power to
not proceed with a prosecution if it were not in the interests of justice. The paper
included old age or infirm health of the accused as examples. In 1997, the gravity
of the crime and interests of victims were proposed as positive balancing factors.
During the Zutphen negotiations, Article 47 was made to reflect that the question
whether a subsequent  prosecution would be in the interests of justice should serve
as a consideration with regards to opening an investigation, while the travaux tell
us that IoJ was envisaged originally for the initiation of prosecution rather than an
investigation. The requirement was incorporated in Article 53(2)(c), but no such
clarity was provided regarding the opening of an investigation under Article 53(1)(c).
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The literal, contextual, and teleological interpretation of the IoJ suggests that it
means ‘legal interests affecting or influencing international criminal justice’, meaning
that the factors needed to offset the gravity of crime and the interests of victims must
be legal in nature and related to international criminal justice. In the light of the good
faith obligation, which encompasses the principle of effectiveness, the meaning
favours international investigation and prosecution. Accordingly, the phrase has a
narrow scope.
Thus, the VCLT only serves to determine whether the IoJ has a broad or narrow
meaning. It allows us to trace the outer scope of the phrase but not its contents and
doesn’t provide an understanding of the factors to be included within the IoJ. And it
is rightly so, as such an indeterminate term can’t be defined in the abstract, or even
applied concretely.
Assessment of “Interests of Justice” at the ICC – a practical question?
While policy factors are non-legal, they are nevertheless important in guiding the
Prosecutor’s decision. In practice, factors like state cooperation and budgetary
limitations of the OTP become relevant in assessing the feasibility of carrying
out an investigation. However, lack of feasibility doesn’t necessarily negate the
appropriateness of an investigation or the IoJ.
For example, in 2014, the Trial Chamber found the Government of Kenya guilty of
non-compliance because of their failure to cooperate with the OTP investigations.
Similarly, the OTP in 2012 acknowledged the difficulties it faced conducting
the preliminary examination in Afghanistan due to security concerns as well as
limited state cooperation. For the benefit of intra-institutional governance, the OTP
considers these factors as a matter of policy. However, these weren’t factored into
the IoJ clause and no decision against an investigation was taken by the Prosecutor
in her request for authorization.
Having recognised the limitations of the VCLT, judges can use policy factors in their
interpretation. However, to be clear, the same cannot be done in the name of VCLT.
Taking two years to adjudicate the Afghanistan request, the PTCs majority opinion
indulged in speculative exercise and nitpicking of facts by doubting the availability
of state cooperation, evidence, and the potential accused persons. The decision
doesn’t explain how it undertook the task of locating the content of the IoJ clause.
In contrast, Judge Mindua in his separate opinion (para 29) indicated using
Article 31-32 VCLT, but the application wasn’t express. While he agrees with the
Prosecutor that the feasibility of an investigation isn’t a ‘separate and self-standing
factor’, reading it with the Court’s alleged budget constraints and absence of state
cooperation, he holds it as a relevant consideration.
On appeal, there were multiple submissions by amici curiae. Only the submission by
Professor Jennifer Trahan rightly undertook the task of culling out a meaning of IoJ
using the VCLT, arguing for a narrow understanding. She concurs that the factors
which can be read into IoJ aren’t exhaustive but that they must be legal. However,
in its decision, the Appeals Chamber failed to deliberate on the meaning of the IoJ
- 3 -
clause. Following the previous jurisprudence of the PTC, the Court merely reaffirmed
the negative formulation of Article 53(1)(c) and the balancing test which is required
for IoJ vis à vis the gravity of the crime and interests of victims.
The Appeals Chamber held that while authorizing a proprio motu initiation of an
investigation, the PTC cannot review the IoJ requirement even though it might have
been a consideration for the Prosecutor. Consequently, the PTC under Article 15(4)
must only check if there is a reasonable factual basis, i.e. whether crimes have
been committed within a situation and potential cases would appear to fall within the
jurisdiction of the Court.
A lost opportunity
Having ruled that the PTC has no power to review the Prosecutor’s assessment of
the ‘reasonable basis’ under Article 53(1)(a-c) in a case of proprio motu initiation of
an investigation, it is understandable that the Chamber refrained from substantiating
on the IoJ clause for the sake of judicial economy. Doing so, the Court has however
lost an opportunity to clarify the contents of the existing constructive ambiguity and to
reconcile the question of the application of VCLT within the Rome Statute. Therefore,
although the Afghanistan pre-trial decision was bad in law, it was a welcome attempt
to put to rest the uncertainty couched in the interests of justice.
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